Hitler could have won world war II (how)

série:	2ème guerre mondiale
éditeur:	River Press
auteur:	Alexander Bevin
classement:	biblio2C
année:	2000
format:	broché
état:	TBE
valeur:	8 €
critère:	**
remarques:	English book Hitler's strategy and his fatal errors 1) Dunkerque 2) England 3) Soviet Union 4) the Mediterranean 5) Stalingrad 6) Normandy 7) battle of the bulge the book analyzes Hitler's greatest errors who had rather a continental view instead of a worldwide view also a very good introduction about Hitler's strategy but the book lacked some overall view of Hitler's position, however the strategical and tactical targets are well described from 1933 to 1940, Hitler's strategy to strike the weak and avoid the strength was right (according to the principles of Sun Tzu) n.b. the art of war is an ancient Chinese military treatise dating from the 5th century BC. attributed to the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu = "master sun"", the text is composed of 13 chapters, each of which is devoted to one aspect of warfare. it is commonly thought of as a definitive work on military strategy and tactics, it was placed at the head of China's seven military classics upon the collection's creation in 1080 by emperor Shenzong of Song and has long been the most influential strategy text in East Asia; it has had an influence on Eastern and Western military thinking, business tactics, legal strategy and beyond, leaders as diverse as Mao Zedong, General Vo Nguyen Giap, General Douglas MacArthur as well as leaders of Imperial Japan have drawn inspiration from the work the three main errors Hitler did: - attack Russia frontally - allow Britain and the US to build immense military power - not being able to prevent them to strike into German's weakness 1/ Germany's opportunity for victory Hitler was evil person but a skilled politician he thought after his victory over France that he was a military genius but the victory was principally due to Manstein and Guderian who mostly brought up the tactical ideas then Hitler thought that Britain was no longer a problem at mid 40, Hitler was left with only weak and vulnerable obstacles in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East but his paranoia overhelmed his political sense, he should have continued to strike the weak obstacle also in his campaigns, the "no retreat" strategy (as Stalin did in the beginning) destroyed large portions of his army the way to victory should not have been direct attack on the Soviet Union but indirect approach through North Africa after having seized Egypt, Germany would have had access to Irak, Iran and their oil fields they would also have been in a position to isolate Turkey, threaten Britain in India and Germany would have been within striking distance to Soviet Union from the Caucasus in fact the greatest error of Hitler was to declare war to the Soviet Union on a frontal attack 2/ the campaign in the west, 1940 10.5.1940 1800 tanks cut off the main part of the French and British armies and after considering he could invade Britain, Hitler thought that the only way to beat Britain was to destroy the Soviet Union; left alone, Britain would have been obliged to make a cease-fire the reason was that Russia was in reach whereas Britain not (and Hitler was eager to make an alliance with Britain) furthermore, Hitler - as expressed in "mein Kampf" - had 2 objectives: destroy the Soviet Union and the Jews regarding the "Lebensraum", an industrial state would not necessarily need to have more land since it could buy its food easily, but of course it was subject to military sanctions and in blockade during a war; the "holocaust" and the final solution took also immense amounts of resources and personnel, badly needed for the war effort until 1940, Hitler's most victories were due to his political skill without the use of force >> p. 6/7 the new weapons and vehicles of the modern war: the formation of the "Panzerdivisionen" which were in fact an army in the army (n.b. but Alexander in that connection only mentions Fuller and Hart and not De Gaulle) the tactics of the PD: concentrate strength at one point to achieve a breakthrough and the allies did not realize the effect of massing large numbers of tanks attacking in one formation a further efficient weapon was the somehow obsolete Stuka = Sturzkampfflugzeug which was used as an aerial artillery with great accuracy and accompanying the panzer (instead of area bombing), of course because of its weakness in the air, the Stuka was to be given fighter-cover but it was the best weapon to assure panzer attacks giving ground-support on the battle lines 3/ the defeat of France the campaign in the west was a surprise for the allies they had supposed a great german offensive in Belgium where they had concentrated their forces they would better have a defensive line on the Belgian frontier or south of the Somme so that they could be ready to counter-attack (but French resented now to fight again on French territory) a long war would be to the advantage of the Allies since they had unlimited resources from Asia, Africa and America on 17.2.1940 Manstein submits his plan to Hitler who decides to adopt this plan which proposed to break into the Ardennes so that to outflank the allied armies in Belgium (it was somehow the contrary of the Schlieffen's plan in 1914) two Panzergruppen were to lead the offensive: - group A of von Rundstedt with 5 Panzerdivisionen (Reinhard, Guderian, Rommel, Wietersheim and Hoth) - group B of von Bock with 3 Panzerdivisionen (among them Hoepner) the "mot d'ordre" was fast moving units at that time France had no firm government and Churchill had just replaced Chamberlain on 9.5.1940 the Allies had more artillery guns but only few aircraft and antitank guns, they had also more tanks (some even superior to the german Mark IV) but spread out only in the air was the german Luftwaffe somehow superior in numbers with the "Blitzkrieg", the situation would however change by the hour and the enemy was not given time to catch up in Holland 4000 paratroops (the first great airborne assault in history) grabbed 4 airports enabling further troops to arrive by transport aircraft and by 14.5.1940 the Dutch had capitulated the Luftwaffe gained the upper hand thanks to their Messerschmitt 109 while most of the Spitfires (the only ones able to catch up with the Messerschmitt) were held in Britain as a reserve on 18.5.1940 Antwerp is occupied, 19.5. Guderian reaches St-Quentin a counterattack from De Gaulle armory division does not bring much success since too small and not being able to struck hard at a single point (also they had no aircraft support) another counter-attack of the allies south of Arras is only prevented thanks to the 88mm-guns which smashed most of the British tanks if the panzer had continued and seized Dunkirque, 400'000 men of the BEF and French soldiers would have had to surrender but the panzer had to stop before reaching Dunkirque and 335'000 men escaped through the channel, it was the miracle of Dunkirque, after Dunkirque, the PD were reorganized into Panzer Corps (= one motorized and two armor divisions) 14.6.1940 Paris is reached and on 16.6. the French asked for an armistice 4/ Hitler's first great error the next move was the invasion of England but before air and sea supremacy by Germany hat to be achieved >> p. 37 the French fleet (3.7.1940 english raid on Mers-el-Kebir) 1.8.1940 beginning of the battle of England 675 fighters hereof 40% Spitfires against 875 german Messerschmitt 109 however the British had the radar which would spot 120 miles away incoming enemy aircraft moreover german fighters could only protect their own bombers for some minutes (about 15-20 minutes) since they had to fly from the continent and back (max. 400 miles range) another error was to bomb London instead or airfields, factories and radar stations this due to 80 UK bombers which did bomb Berlin in retaliation of some german bombs sent by error over London this was the new strategy from Hitler in order to sap the morale of the civil population so that their government would have to arrange peace however this strategy did not work with Churchill and the german bombing did no significant role in deciding the battle of England and finally the battle of England ended by mid september but if the Luftwaffe had continued its original target, the RAF was on the verge to be beaten meanwhile Roosevelt started to support Britain as much as possible the USA would become the arsenal of democracy (lend-lease law) 5/ the fatal turn to the east Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union was not taken favourably by his officers considering the threat remaining on the western front with Britain and the USA they proposed instead to seize Egypt to break indirectly british resistance admiral Raeder was the most intelligent man in that question whereas Hitler had only a continental outlook Hitler relied on Mussolini to get Egypt into Axis hands but italian forces were badly equipped and lacked good leadership and when at this time Germany offered some support, Mussolini refused 6/ attacking the wrong island 7.12.1940 the british overran the italian line with less in number but more mobile troops within 3 days, 50% of the Italians were captured Bardia gave up, then Tobrouk nearly without resistance and in Albania the italian forces were obliged to retreat against the relatively small greek army threatened now by Germany, Churchill want to back up Greece and does not wish to continue the offensive in Libya beyond the line of El Agheila however general O'Connor could have occupied Tripoli even without reinforcement, thus already evicting Italy from North Africa 53'000 british troops were involved in a expeditionary corps in Greece 6.4.1941 german onslaught on Yugoslavia and Greece within 3 weeks and Hitler made a further error: invade Crete instead of Malta which was strategically more important than Creta both Hitler and Churchill were persuaded of Creta's importance for Hitler because of the threat to the rumanian oil fields and for Churchill in order to still influence Turkey on Creta general Freyberg had 36'000 men but only armed with light weapons however the invaded paratroops did not have better weapons however they benefited a least of air cover 7/ Rommel's unappreciated gift the seize of Creta was an enormous loss for both sides and Malta still remained in british hand whereas the main Axis supply line ran as before past Malta nevertheless Creta was of great experience for paratroops operations it was also the first great air-sea battle of the second world war ending 29.5.1941 Rommel arrives in Tripoli on 14.2.1941 and sweeps back at once the british forces from Cyrenaica should he had received the two Panzerdivisionen he asked for , he would most probably have achieved the conquest of Egypt but Hitler did not recognize the gift offered to him by Rommel supplement to chapter seven most of the high officers with Hitler recommended to switch for the Mediterranean area to defeat Britain indirectly and for that purporse first neutralize Malta but Hitler did not want to commit himself in North Africa (what a misjudgement!) however he was somehow interested to capture Gibraltar but Franco did not want the Germans to cross Spain to attack Gibraltar nevertheless by occupying French North Africa, Hitler would have had the opportunity at least to block the straits of Gibraltar and this was another mistake of Hitler, he should have forced France to let Germans occupy some bases in North Africa, with some landing troops and especially air bases at least Churchill recognizes the importance of Egypt and the Suez Canal, the gate to Middle East and its oil, moreover if occupying Egypt and the Middle East, the Germans would have had the possibility to block supply lines through Iran to the Soviet Union the Caucasus oil fields would also be in near reach and Turkey would have been obliged to support Germany (at least authorize transit transport) Rommel spotted immediately how the desert war had to be fought: like a war at sea, all depended on mobility, non-motorized troops were of no value and in that challenge, Rommel became one of the greatest generals in modern times he would have just needed one or 2 more Panzerdivisionen and in 1941 he would certainly have been in a position to conquer Egypt n.b. curiously von Manstein, contrary to Guderian, was not in favour of an operation in North Africa, he pretended that would only split the german forces he would rather try at once a landing in Britain 8/ Barbarossa that is the typical example of a war destined to destruction by brutal frontal attack, a flank attack is always best because it separates the enemy forces from his supplies the next error of Hitler was to go into the Soviet union as a conqueror and not as a liberator he wanted to eliminate the slav people for getting land to the Germans the various people welcomed the arrival of the Germans and would back them against Stalin but then considering their attitude, they finally fight them, organizing resistance pockets which disturbed german supply lines the strategical goals of Hitler were also not ideal, Hitler hoped the sovieet army would collapse from internal stress he was wrong a good general wins his battles before he fights them Hitler should have concentrated to only one goal instead of three: Moscow and then turn right and left the ratio of space was also too much, 20 times the one in the west = about half of the USA! at the beginning, the "Kesselschlacht" were in favour of Hitler: - center: Bialystock, Minsk, Smolensk - north: none - south: Kiev, Uman, Odessa, Pervomaysk but despite these great successes in the beginning, it was impossible to achieve the targets of the 3 army groups also the shifting of important forces from north to south and from south to north delayed and hindered the reach of the targets there were 3 targets and all failed: Leningrad, Moscow and the Caucasus (all were nearly reached but failed short before the target) therefore by the end of 1941, the war was nearly lost and negotiations - if possible - would have been the best also the plans for Barbarossa were greatly underestimated furthermore two aspects were at Germany's disadvantage: - the Japanese did not attack in Siberia - after the "Kesselschlacht" disasters, Stalin changed his strategy by moving to a "no-retreat position" to strategical retreats by not gaining his targets, Germany went into a war of attrition (long-term factors) and the Soviet Union had the support of the other world (USA supplied vast quantities through Iran) therefore Hitler had no other choice that a quick victory Hitler assembled for Barbarossa 3 mio men, 3350 tanks, 7200 artillery, 2770 aircraft but the Panzerdivisionen were hindered by the poor condition of the roads if any (mud during the wet weather) on the other side, the Soviet Union was not yet prepared for war with Germany and the red army did not concentrate its tanks (in fact more numerous than the german ones and sometimes even better such as the T34) in mass formation and the commanders of the red army were still of low profile 9/ falling between two stools pm 22.6.1941 on the eve of Barbarossa, german air supremacy was complete after destroying within few time 1200 soviet planes >> p. 92 the soviet T34 tank, a very good tank the german offensive is a success but meanwhile it was soon recognized that, if the russian civilian is tough, the russian soldier was even tougher Hitler's further errors: - Guderian and Hoth's Panezrdivision in August 1941 were in sight of Moscow (350 km) and would have reached the capital without great resistance, it was an open road, yet Hitler suddenly ordered Hoth to group North and Guderian to go to group South - a great commander - but Hitler could conceive of no great strategic plan - would now doggedly go for his main objective and ignore peripheral attractive targets - in Kiev, Hitler won a large local victory (665'000 soviet soldiers were trapped = the largest single military success in history) but by doing so, Hitler failed to win the war 10/ failure before Moscow soon after the beginning of Barbarossa by mid-july 1941, the USA decided to extend the lend-lease treaty to the USRR whereas Japan did not join the war against the Soviets by end of July 41, the USA did stop all trade with Japan by end of August, there was a three coalition against Germany and the Allies occupied Iran to supply the soviet army on the eastern front, Leningrad was under siege but this was of no importance to the war and the central offensive was delayed in order to accelerate the offensive in the south finally on 30.9.1941 , the offensive towards Moscow was reset but meanwhile the german army has already lost 500'000 men in the campaign however, the way to Moscow was still opened but by mid-october the mud, the snow and the cold had hindered the penetration in fact the battle of Moscow was now depending on the weather and meanwhile - as Japan did not enter the war - Stalin was able to move his eastern forces to Moscow as Stalin by now had got reinforcements, new artillery (the Katyusha rockets), T34 tanks and strong air fighters, he could even launch a counter-offensive, n.b. katyusha multiple rocket launchers are a type of rocket artillery first built and fielded by the Soviet Union in World War II multiple rocket launchers such as these deliver explosives to a target area more quickly than conventional artillery, but with lower accuracy and requiring a longer time to reload they are fragile compared to artillery guns, but are inexpensive and easy to produce, Katyushas of World War II, the first self-propelled artillery, were mass-produced by the Soviet Union, they were usually mounted on trucks this mobility gave the Katyusha (and other self-propelled artillery) another advantage: being able to deliver a large blow all at once, and then move before being located and attacked with counter-battery fire. katyusha weapons of World War II included the BM-13 launcher, light BM-8, and heavy BM-31 the Moscow offensive failed with 780'000 human losses = 1/4 of the german army and to make things even worse, Hitler declared war to the USA 4 days after Pearl Harbour! 11/ to and fro in the desert the British used tanks to tanks battles whereas Rommel used antitank guns, espc. the 88 mm to the maximum degree possible holding back his tanks for decisive strikes or movements >> p. 112 the 5-points tactic of Rommel's battles: 1/ concentrate all the forces in one force 2/ protect the supply lines 3/ attack enemy's armor with antitank guns 4/ operate near the front to make decisions more effective (hour by hour) 5/ achieve surprise speed and mobility being primary and Rommel had one secret weapon: the 88 mm AA gun used as antitank gun also the stukas - when protected by fighters - would do a perfect antitank and aerial artillery to knock out with accuracy enemy defensive points 18.11.1941 beginning of operation Crusader by the British >> p. 120/121 the tactical errors of german commander Cruewell permitted to the British to get temporarily the overhand 12/ no change in strategy Hitler had by now two choices: - either cut-off supply lines from the USA and be on the defensive on the eastern fromt or continue his attack on the Soviet Union whereas US and british commanders preferred to inflict an indirect blow to Germany by preparing a landing in western North Africa and then in Italy 13/ the drive to El Alamein there is only a 500 km passage from Sicily to Tripoli but constantly under the threat of Malta Rommel with no adequate force, was a military genius which Hitler did not see after the Gazala battle, brilliantly fought by Rommel with the fall of Tobrouk, the British retreated to El Alamein, the last but formidable defense line between the Mediterranean sea and the Qattara depression but Rommel was at the tag of his supply line (2400 km from Tripoli to El Alamein) on 30.6.1942 Rommel reached El Alamein with only 26 tanks (!!) and could not force the well-defended british line for Rommel and his troops exhausted, the war in Africa was practically over 14/ Stalingrad where Hitler engineered his own destruction, never again would Hitler have free movement during the war against the USSR Hitler made again a fatal error: split his already weakened troops into two targets: Stalingrad and the Caucasus only one target would anyway be nearly too much! the second error was to occupy Stalingrad-city at any cost with a dangerous salient occurring on the northern flank it was in 1943 that Hitler's generals ascertained that Hitler was no longer a military commander the russian front line was now 4800 km long from the Baltic to the Black sea anyway during summer 1942, german troops had three further victories: Kerch, Kharkov and the Krim after this, Hitler ordered the two offensives to Stalingrad and the Caucasus but this time, the Soviets did not experience "cauldron" battles any longer and retreated orderly Hitler made also an irreparable error: he believed the Soviets to be crushed down and postponed Stalingrad's offensive in favour of the Caucasus considering that at this time, Stalingrad would have fallen without great resistance two weeks later, Stalin had brought sufficient forces in Stalingrad to resist also the offensive to Stalingrad was protected on the northern salient by only badly equipped italian, rumanian and hungarian troops the offensive could have been stopped at Rynok where the Volga traffic could be sealed off, however Hitler wanted a prestigious victory by occupying Stalingrad completely; as some generals (Halder, List, Wietersheim) started to make some objections, Hitler dismissed them being still of the opinion that the soviet army was now completely shattered on november 1942 beginning of the great soviet offensive which closed Stalingrad with 250'000 german soldiers inside surrounded in a pocket of about 40 x 50 km 15/ Manstein saves the army Manstein succedeed in repelling further soviet offensives towards Rostov and started operation "tempest" to deliver the 6th army in Stalingrad but a further fierce soviet offensive on the 8th italian army further north on 16.12.1942 ruined Manstein's plans to save the 6th army according to the author, it was Paulus' cowardice not to try a breakout despite Hitler's orders in desperation, Manstein had to leave the 6th army to its destiny and had to retreat to the Rostov front line but Manstein not only tried to disengage the 6th army, he managed to save the whole german forces south in Caucasus and prepared brilliant opportunities to back off soviet forces but Hitler did not approve his plans, Hitler stuck to his "defense of every foot of ground" the only advantage of the 6th army in Stalingrad was to tie down as long as possible a large amount of soviet forces to discharge the front line at Rostov 16/ the western allies strike meanwhile the allied were concerned about where to help defeat of Hitler to avoid Stalin doing a separate peace with the Reich and to show Stalin, they could also make a blow to Hitler, they decided to land in North Africa (but still keeping in mind a landing in the Normandy) there would be 3 landing aereas: West coast of Marocco, Oran and Algiers these landings were achieved without great resistance but Tunesia was not on reach and therefore Hitler's reaction was swift Hitler and Mussolini sent 150'000 men to Tunesia despite the fact that the Allies had air and naval supremacy and that these troops would be very badly needed when the invasion of Sicilia was performed meanwhile at El Alamein, Rommel fought well but he could not stand the overhelming british forces of the 8th army with 200'000 men and 600 tanks against Rommel's 80'000 men with 30 tanks left!! 17/ Kasserine and the end in Africa Germans and Italians retreated up to Tunesia where there was some kind of rivality between Rommel and the new commander von Arnim despite a victory at the Kasserine pass against fresh american troops, the Axis was trapped in Tunis and had to surrender on 7.5.1943 allied forces were now 300'000 men with 1400 tanks against 60'000 german soldiers with 100 tanks at the end it was also the time of general Patton who succeeded to the less efficient commander Fredendall n.b. Patton was dyslexic (difficulty to read and speak) but he was a boast commander 18/ the invasion of Sicily when Hitler would have now taken a defensive role instead of trying to attack everywhere, he might have arranged a stalemate with the USSR now the landing of the Allies in Sicily went on without great resistance but the Germans could escape through the straits of Messina the invasion started on 7.7.1943 and was finished by the end of August for the first time, it was made use of the LST (landing ship tanks) and the allied air supremacy was again predominant 19/ the citadel disaster strategical withdrawals in great open spaces by the Germans would have been in favour of german panzer since the quality of german command staffs and fighting troops were superior to those of the Soviets and the offensive of Koursk which then has become a formidable fortress was another great error of Hitler german forces were now in all 4,4 mio men and the soviet forces amounted to 6,1 mio and by now the allied production exceeded much more the german production Koursk battle: Germany: 1 mio men, 10'000 artillery, 2000 tanks and 2000 aircraft Sovietunion: 2 mio men, 20'000 artillery, 5000 tanks and 2000 aircraft at Prokhorovka in July 1943, the greatest tank battle in history took place 400 german panzer against 800 soviet tanks the losses were heavy on both side but the Soviets had stopped the Germans and had still huge tank reserves 3 months later, the offensive was now with the soviet army which advanced 500 km west of Koursk Manstein was against the Koursk operation, he would have preferred the Soviets to attack and be worn out but Hitler did not want to cede any ground, he always stubbornly resisted to any retreat, even for strategical reason appendix the greatest errors Hitler did for the operation Barbarossa a) to be a conqueror instead of a liberator, he therefore alienated to Germany the people of the occupied territories b) not to have concentrated his forces on one target instead of chasing three hares at the same time: Leningrad, Ukraine and Moscow n.b. Hitler wanted to reach the line Archangelks/Caspian sea already in 1941 c) underestimation of the the Soviet forces (he had to admit this himself) d) underestimation of supply lines and equipment e) underestimation of weather condition f) he was also wrong when he hoped that Japan would support him by attacking the Soviet Union the task for his army was almost inconceivable, the three objectives were each in a distance of about 1000 km the Blitzkrieg failed later on in the steppes of the USSR on the other side the Sovietunion had two advantages: - they had practically unlimited resources in raw materials and people (in fact later on, soviet production exceeded german production) - they could reck on support from the rest of the world on the beginning of the war, the Soviets were taken by real surprise (Stalin even ignored all warnings he had received) also the red army was not ready, it was in course of reorganisation and luckily for them, the german mobility was soon restricted by unconditional matters (weather conditions, poor roads, supply lines too far away, etc) - by 1943, the incapacity of Hitler as a commander was revealed and the german army had to defend a line of 2800 miles from the Baltic sea to the Black sea - furthermore the Germans were now faced with lack in tank production, 50% less aircraft than in June 1941, shortage in fuel and ammunition as well as insufficient artillery - however in armor operations in respect of mobility and surprise offensives, the command staffs and soldiers were superior to the Soviets - but on head-to-head confrontations, the Germans could not match the Soviets and this was just what happened during the battle of Koursk = strongest fortress in the world but Hitler did not understand mobile warfare or temporary retreat to give his forces freedom in the tactical operations, also the Soviets picked up details of operation Citadel (battle of Koursk) directly from a spy ring in Switzerland and therefore were quite prepared to face the german offensive 20/ the assault on Italy the landing of the allies (sea and air landing) should have been made 300 miles north of Rome instead of Salerno the Germans round of Roma were at that time too weak to repulse any attack and Rome together with southern Italy might have fallen within some days after having lost about 22'000 men, Americans and Britons reached Naples by mid-november 1943 but were halted at the Gustav line in view however of the landing in Normandy, Italy has become then a secondary war theater but the Gustav line was a formidable barrier for the Allies who decided to make a second landing a second landing at Anzio north of the Gustav line (but again perhaps to short in range) having in mind to cut off supply lines of german troops >> p. 228 the assault on Monte Cassino finally, the french forces of general Juin consisting mainly of moroccan goumis (from the atlas mountains) succeeded in piercing the german lines on 15.5.1944 Rome was then in reach and declared open city when entered by the allies on 6.6.1944 (the day of Overlord) however the italian campaign had not been a good investment for the Allies losing about 50'000 men against 10'000 to the Germans however from now on, the progress of the allies was slow but steady 21/ the Normandy two solutions were possible for the Germans: the proposal of Guderian for holding the Panzerdivisionen in the inland (far from naval artillery) whereas the one of Rommel was to stationing the Panzerdivisioen not far from the beaches but at a early stage Rommel was of the opinion that the landing would take place at Pas-de-Calais finally the decision about involving the Panzerdivisionen remained with Hitler and his decision was subject to some delay but he was the only one at the beginning who foresees a landing in the Normandy! due to great aircraft supremacy (espc. now with the new fighter Mustang P51), the Luftwaffe was practically out of action and with the secretly arranged mulberries = artificial harbours, the allies did not need immediate use of continental ports and therefore preferred to land by surprise in the Normandy still within range of their fighters to protect ground troops the great error of the german commandment was the fact that they should have spotted three possible landing sites: the Cotentin, the Normandy and the Pas-de-Calais instead of spreading their forces along the Atlantic coast and therefore should have placed on each segment Panzerdivisionen in reserve calling the other ones back as soon as the landing was ascertained there was no compromise and Hitler decided on his own to disperse the army and armor units from Belgium to Bordeaux! and the involvement of the Panzerdivisionen had to be engaged on his own order in the States, Franklin Roosevelt appointed Eisenhower as general commander of operation Overlord instead of Marshall from whom Roosevelt needed the presence at home Eisenhower's deputy war UK air chief Tedder, Montgomery was to command all ground forces with Bradley commander of the US forces and Dempsey of the british forces >> p. 238 to allow rehearsal (repetition exercise) of the landing with live ammunition, a 25 square mile region in the Devonshire (south of England) was evacuated allied forces amounted to 1 mio men, 137'000 vehicles hereof 4200 fully tracked vehicles, 3500 artillery and 5000 fighters >> p. 239 operation Fortitude to lure the Germans on a landing at Pas-de-Calais after landing, the plan was for the british troops on the left side to seize Caen and go for Antwerp whereas the Americans would go south of Paris to the german border on the Rhine shortly before landing, heavy bombing was effected on communication roads and railway all over northern France as well as on german industrial centers, espc. oil and ball-bearing (roulement à bille) industries and in fact the lack of fuel on the german side delayed the commitment of german tanks and other vehicles, espc. the action of the newly introduced german jet-engine fighters (M262) 6.6.1944 was finally chosen as D-Day and the key to the Normandy was the seizure of Caen on the first day, but despite aircraft supremacy and airborn troops, this goal could not be achieved before many weeks the landings were not smashed but somehow delayed, nevertheless after five days, it was clear that the Germans could no longer repel the allied forces 22/ the liberation of France during June 44, the Germans suffered heavy losses, von Rundstedt was replaced by von Kluge who could do no better on 20.7.44 a bomb destroyed german headquarters but Hitler survived end of June, allied forces had occupied Cherbourg but were still unable to drove Germans out of Caen the Americans reached Avranches and St-Lô but they were faced by a difficult obstacle (the Norman bocage = hedgerows) and Germans resisted quite strongly, using mortars, then the american tanks were equiped with hedgerow cutters near Caen, Montgomery launched "operation Goodwood" but lost in one day 4000 men and 500 tanks and Bradley's "operation Cobra" met heavy resistance despite preliminary heavy bombing finally during beginning of July, Patton reached Avranches and swang south, past the german forces, aiming to the south of Paris in order to cut off german forces in the Normandy Patton's targets were Laval, Le Mans, Orléans and Troyes a german counter-attack towards Avranches was much to weak with no aircraft support and the Germans were now endangered to be encircled by the american forces coming from the south and by the Canadian forces coming from the north at Falaise the Germans were now nearly blocked in the Falaise pocket opened to allied aircraft and artillery with only a 20 km wide gap east of Falaise to escape meanwhile on 20.7.1944 "operation dragon" in the south of France had started Model replaced von Kluge on 17.8.44 and succeeded in evacuating most of the german forces from the pocket of Falaise in the southeast, Patton on 25.8.44 had already reached Troyes and was going to enter Metz, in 10 days he could have been in Germany Montgomery's troops arrived in Anwerp on 4.9.44 and his further plan was to cross the Rhine at Arnheim where a large airborne operation (market garden) failed completely in the east by end of 1944, the Soviets had occupied Warsaw, Budapest and had forced Finland, Romania, Bulgaria and Ungary out of war 23/ the battle of bulge (= salient) the plan of Hitler was to swing down to Antwerp from the Ardennes and destroy allied supply lines the plan was good but Hitler had no longer the means for carrying it out, nevertheless it was a complete surprise for the allies it was a desperation move with the aim of being able to negotiate with the Allies the commander of the offensive was Sepp Dietrich, operation was named "Herbstnebel" the problem was motor transport and short supply of fuel the attack was dated on 16.12.1944 meanwhile the allied troops have been halted on the Siegfried line with heavy losses after 10 days, the german offensive was stopped due to the mud, lack of fuel as well as reinforcements to the allied forces; Dietrich's troops had to retreat on 24.12. abandoning tanks and other vehicles due to lack of fuel and on 25.12. a clear sky came back enabling allied aircraft to spread havoc on german columns the key of the Ardennes, Bastogne, could however not be overhelmed by the Germans on the 8.1.1945 the Germans had to retreat on the whole front and on 28.1. were again on their start lines there were heavy losses on both sides but the Allies could quickly replace their losses whereas the Germans could not and their offensive, although delaying allied offensives for a couple of weeks, had given much advantage to the red army advancing very quickly on the eastern front 24/ the last days the red army had to stop on the Vistule by autumn 1944 to reorganize supply and troops but by January 1945, the red army had 225 infantry divisions and 22 armored corps between the Baltic and the Carpathian moreover they had received a huge quantity of US trucks enabling them to move quickly on the other hand, the Silesia was now for Germany the most producing industrial area whereas the Ruhr was nearly paralized by bombing attacks the final move of the red army was now towards Berlin, 500 km from the Vistule on 31.1.1945 the red army occupied Silesia and was now only 100 km from Berlin Budapest fell on 20.2.1945 Eisenhower with 85 divisions was now ready to cross the Rhine on 7.3.1945 the Rhine was crossed at Remagen and Koblenz by 22.3.1945 Patton had reached Mannheim and shortly afterwards Nuremberg encircling 300'000 german soldiers, on 18.4.1945 Montgomery reached Lübeck, it was the end of the Third Reich n.b. - in 1937 the USA got 42% of the world's industrial production, 15% to Germany, 14% to the Sovietunion, 10% to Britain, 4% to France and Japan, 2% Italy - in 1943 Germany produced despite bombing, 6000 tanks, 110'000 trucks, 37'000 cannons, 4400 88mm guns and 25'600 military aircraft but fuel production was anyway very scarce >> p. 319 the SS = 900'000 men in 1944 incl. the Schutzstaffeln, Sicherheitsdienst = SD, concentration camp guards, Gestapo, rulers of occupied territories and Waffen SS the Tiger tank, 56 tons, 88mm gun, 100 mm armor, 200 km range the Panther tank, 50 tons, 75mm gun, 110 mm armor, 300 km range were probably the best tanks of the second world war >> p. 320 the V1 rocket with 250 km range reached a speed of 600 km/h whereas the V2 rocket with 300 km range reached 4000 km/hour >> quite a good book about Hitler's strategy and tactical movements during second world war, developing the most important events and battles of the war with some additional and well designed maps the book also analyzes Hitler's errors (the main one being having chosen a frontal offensive against the Sovietunion n.b. however it is always easier to study events afterwards would Hitler have had a worldwide view instead of a continental view of the conflict, he may well have won the war >> see in that connection the introduction of the book (one of the most interesting part of the book) appendix the main continuous errors of Hitler in respect of military operations were his insistence on offensive solutions to military problems when the strength of his army was no longer adequate and also his strategy of "no retreat" on which Stalin did no longer insist after some desastrous defeats Egypt in 1940 was only defended by one single armored division after France's campaign, Hitler had 10 divisions and only four would have been sufficient to conquer Egypt and then the Mediterranean sea would have become an Axis sea (with the occupation of Egypt, the Royal Navy would have had no other choice then leaving the Mediterranean sea except possibly keeping the base of Gibraltar (but then Spain may well have shifted to the Axis and together with Germany conquer Gibraltar) after the occupation of Egypt, consequently Yugoslavia, Greece and Creta would had have to surrender without even a German military operation and most probably Turkey would have been obliged to cooperate with Germany if then Germany would have occupied the whole of North Africa, they would have been in a position to reach Dakar from which submarines and aircraft would have greatly threatened the South Atlantic sea routes that would have been indirect (and non frontal) action to the weak part of England one of the biggest errors of Hitler was however to declare war to the USA without the support of the Sovietunion (if Hitler had not invaded Russia), the USA may not have challenged Germany, as they were at that time affected by the Japanese offensive further two main errors of Hitler were to declare war to the Sovietunion and destroying the Jews and other races; that took too much of his attention and was anyway an illogical process Hitler thought wrongly he could easily beat Russia whereas the invasion of Britain was rather hazardous and Britain would anyway mostly rely on the USA rather that on the Sovietunion (Churchill did not appreciate cutting partly US shipments to the Sovietunion rather than to England) however Hitler did not want to destroy Britain, he admired the English people and the British Empire he wanted the British Empire to survive in Britain would give him a free hand in the East but Britain could also not survive as an independent state if Europe was completely controlled by Germany (this had historical background) a war against Russia would be nothing like a war in the West where distances were limited by the Atlantic boundary, population concentrated and objectives in range the Sovietunion was so vast that a war there could expand into limitless space, placing potentially impossible demands on the german war machine at the beginning, the Allies did not understand the effect of massing large numbers of tanks for a decisive penetration at a simple point followed by swift movements and coordination (Blitzkrieg) in fact only 7 Panzerdivisionen (but a Panzerdivision was at the same time a little army in the army, they got tanks, artillery, anti-tank guns, workshop, lazarett, etc) were the instrument for victory in the West (about 10% of the whole german army) together of course with the Luftwaffe at the beginning allied forces were 3,37 mio men = 143 divisions (9 british, 22 belgian, 8 dutch and 104 french) against 3 mio = 141 german divisions Allies had 14'000 cannons but 7000 of them were poor field artillery to assist allied infantry, they had also less airplanes and practically no anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons the Allies possessed 3400 tanks against 2700 german ones but allied tanks were spread within the infantry troops only the Luftwaffe was numerically superior enclosures - cover of the book - a Stuka tank-killer (mostly engaged on the Eastern front where Hans-Ulrich Rudel was the most efficient claiming 500 soviet tanks destroyed) - landing in the Normandy
couvertures: