life and death of the Afrika Korps (the)

série:	2nd WW Afrika Korps
éditeur:	Pen & Sword
auteur:	Lewin Ronald
classement:	biblio2C
année:	2003
format:	broché
état:	TBE
valeur:	8 €
critère:	***
remarques:	English book Ronald Lewin (1914–1984), was a British military historian and publishing editor, he served in the Royal Artillery in North Africa and Northwest Europe 1939-1945, he wrote several books on World War II and on commanders e.g. Rommel, Montgomery, Wavell and Slim (Slim the Standard-Bearer received the WH Smith Literary Award), he wrote two books on Ultra (Europe) and the other Ultra (Japan) foreword the story of the New Zealander major Ted Andrews who during the retreat of the Afrika Korps overran a position of the Afrika Korps and came across a substantial quantity of undeveloped films (now at the Imperial War Museum) rather authentic and realistic not as the propaganda films of Goebbels 1) operation sunflower it was not Hitler's plan to lead an African war and the Afrika Korps was mainly raised to support the Italian forces ant it had no special preparations, in fact, in the beginning the Afrika Korps was at a great disadvantage towards the British forces, however 30 years later, the Afrika Korps is still a kind of "brotherhood" - Hitler's directive no 22 was the birth certificate of the Afrika Korps with Rommel as a good choice and his forces soon acquired a great sense of identity, fighting hard but without brutality and with clean hands (no SS troops) enjoying soon a kind of self-respect from the enemy - the desert was an ideal place for the making of war (like a sea battle) with no great civil casualties and soon Rommel was considered as a gentleman by British officers taken prisoners 2) restrictive practices 3 factors influenced the desert war: a) the lines of communication and supply sea transports for the Afrika Korps were always insufficient and the only main land transport remained the via Balbia but there was also always a shortage of transport vehicles and the logistic situation of the Afrika Korps would inevitably deteriorate in direct proportion to the distances it travelled to the east b1) the attitude of the German and Italian high command towards Rommel, a paramater of instability b2) the extravagancy of squandering armored and other forces by the British, whereas with the Germans there was no waste at all and everything had to be carefully cared with (especially considering the poor equipment of the Italian forces) c) the contribution of Ultra and the decoding of Enigma was a further advantage to the British >> p. 34 description of the use of Ultra however Rommel had also his own information system (espc. through Condor however only up to June 1942) and the German interception system led by lieutnant Seebohm was very efficient, until Seebohm was killed during the struggle at Tel el Eisa in July 1942, however on the whole the German intelligence service was outwatched by the British one 3) the tortoise and the hare >> p. 38 if the British expeditionary Corps would not have been sent to Greece at the expense of the Desert force, O'Connor might well have advanced up to Tripoli, before the Afrika Korps had arrived - the main force of Rommel resulted in speed in the action and surprise in the offensive and by 11.4.1941 Rommel had reached Tobrouk, at that time began Rommel's legend, however the Germans failed to attack Tobrouk immediately and afterwards were halted by the strong defences of Tobrouk >> p. 48 the brutal tactic of Rommel to put commanders up to the front line causing many casualties among German leaders >> p. 50 description of the rations and life conditions in the desert in front of Tobrouk - after the failure of operation Brevity, Wavell got some reinforcements for his next offensive Battleaxe beginning 15.6.1941 >> p. 56 the employment of the German FLAK 88 mm gun >> p. 57 the tactical combination of Rommel: sword and shield, defensive >> offensive method (first the antitank guns then the panzer) 4) a midsummer night's dream except for the supply lines and perhaps for the Luftwaffe, the Germans were everywhere superior towards their opponents >> p. 60 the two persons who distinguished themselves particularly during 1941 campaign: - Hauptmann Bach at the Halfaya pass for his gift of command - lieut.-colonel von Wechmar with his reconnaissance units similar to the Desert Long Range Group - Battleaxe was a defeat for the British and Wavell was replaced by Auchinleck who had to prepare the next offensive: Crusader, meanwhile Gariboldi was replaced by general Bastico with Gambarra commander of the Ariete and Trieste motorized divisions, while Rommel had Gause as new chief of staff, the Gambut area containing the group command, axis dumps and workshops, -nevertheless Rommel was still worried by the problem of the supplies with a loss ratio of 50% on the sea convoys and for Rommel it was more than a midsummer night, it was a bad dream! 5) the sunday of the dead for his offensive, which surprised Rommel, Auchinleck had a certain material advantage, however the British were not so qualified as the Germans and during the operations, both sides made a couple of errors: Auchinleck's operations were not deep enough and Rommel did not catch immediately the extent of the offensive, the most important battle developed at Sidi Rezegh on 23.11.1941 called the bloody sunday of the dead, at the end of the day with hundreds of vehicles lingered on the battle field, the Germans had succeeded in repulsing the threat to Tobrouk but Auchinleck had still a numerous superiority and receiving refreshed troops decided to continue the offensive obliging Rommel now without reinforcements to withdraw to the west on 26.11.1941 6) roundabouts and swings meanwhile Auchinleck had Cunningham replaced by Ritchie and the British troops linked up with Tobrouk on 27.11.1941 >> p. 112 the comments of general von Ravenstein about Rommel (dissatisfaction about Rommel's leadership) >> p. 116 the dispute with Gambarra - Rommel had to withdraw but it was rather a a fighting retreat and the British could never take the Afrika Korps by surprise, thus the Afrika Korps remained unbroken 7) the cauldron boils - further to the events in the Far East which distracted the British and Rommel having received some reinforcements due to the severe assaults of the Luftwaffe on Malta, Rommel started a new offensive on 21.1.1942 up to the Gazala defense line and on 26.5.1942 with 300 panzer, some good antitank guns and 88mm as well as about 10'000 vehicles, Rommel started operation Venezia during which he intended to dash southwards and encircling the British arrears up to the coast but his panzer did not succeed to reach the coast, supply lines were disrupted and the Bir Hakeim fortress resisted and remained a threat in Rommel's offensive, - after one day Rommel had already 1/3 of his panzer out of action but luckily he succeeded in attracting the British tanks in a trap during the battle called "the battle of the cauldron". on 15.6. - the battle of Gazala was won by Rommel but both sides were on the eve of exhaustion and if the 8th army had been destroyed by 50%, the rest of the army could retreat to Egypt thanks to the formidable resistance of Bir Hakeim which tied up the Germans for about 10 days >> p. 130 the power of the new Grant tanks - nevertheless this time after a short but strong assault on Tobrouk, the fortress was taken in one day on 20.6.1942 and it was a masterpiece of rapid improvisation and combination between the Afrika Korps and the Luftwaffe >> p. 136 the capture of Tobrouk >> p. 137 the delights of Tobrouk (beer, rations, water, clothes, tobacco), however most of the fuel dumps could be demolished 8) advance without security >> p. 139 the new sport of the Afrika Korps: to mingle into retreating enemy forces (to remember: more than 50% of the German vehicles were captured vehicles from the British) - but now on the eve of victory, the German high command left Rommel on his own into Egypt without the necessary security, short of armour, short of men with a job lot of transport, out-running his air cover and extending his lines of supply, the port of Tobrouk being of little help to the sea convoys and moreover the capture of Malta was postponed (n.b. however the invasion of Malta would have signified a stop for Rommel and he was now determined to harass the retreating British up to Egypt, but did he realize that for this purpose his forces were just to weak and that the Afrika Korps would now always lack the strength for a decisive blow? whereas the American supplies arrived now in great volume in Egypt, hereof 300 new produced Sherman tanks and the Desert Air Force now ruled the sky practically without any Luftwaffe's intervention) - nevertheless Marsa Matrouh (6oo km from Tobrouk) was occupied without great resistance and the Germans arrived at el Alamein beginning of July but failed to conquer the box fortress which was in fact at that time quite vulnerable and later on, the first offensives of Rommel were all repulsed with Alexandria looking far away (in fact 2 hours driving from El Alamein!) - the battle continued round the blood-soaked promontory of the Ruweisat Ridge which was the key of El Alamein's defences >> p. 147 by that time the sickness ratio among the German troops was very high (in fact more that the loss ratio during battles!) - a counter-offensive by Auchinleck failed on 15.7.1942 but he succeeded in destroying most of the Italian divisions obliging Rommel to mix them with German troops - at that time Churchill replaced Auchinleck by Montgomery and during his last offensive on 31.8, known as the battle of the 6 days, Rommel had to reduce, again due to lack of fuel, the spread of his offensive coming now right into the strong defense position of the British (well informed of Rommel's plan by Ultra), at Alam Halfa with the total support of the Desert Air Force which raids the Germans with the operation nicknamed "party rally bombing" 9) decision at El Alamein Rommel at Alamein was now engaged into a position-warfare he could not win, the classic situation would now have been withdrawal but Hitler's and Mussolini's orders were to stand - on 23.10.1942 during Rommel's absence (replaced by general Stumme) after a very good preparation and a heavy artillery fire with unlimited resources, Montgomery launched his front offensive, two days later the British had lost 250 tanks but the 15th Panzerdivision had lost 75 panzer out of 112 - at that date the British offensive had no great success but Montgomery insisted and launched his second big offensive "supercharge", the first stroke failed but on 1.11. the Germans could no longer resist a second stroke and despite Hitler's instructions Rommel ordered the retreat but with some heavy losses: Ariete and most Italian divisions as well as some German ones were nearly destroyed, general von Thoma taken prisoner and it was no longer possible to evacuate most of the infantry divisions 10) no laurels in Africa? - on 8.11. the American forces landed in Northwest Africa, for Rommel this was the end of the Afrika Korps, nevertheless he succeeded in retreating with most of his motorizing forces (which should have been destroyed as a consequence of El Alamein but Montgomery was slow to encircle the remnants of the Afrika Korps and on this point Montgomery has failed) >> p. 177 the remaining forces of the Afrika Korps: 4200 men, 11 Panzer and 20 antitank guns >> p. 178 the map of the retreat >> p. 179 the glorious retreat of Ramcke's survivors - El Agheila was reached on 24.11.1942 and despite the efforts of the 8th army, every time the lean fox snarled and retreated! - the situation stabilized for a while in front of Tripoli, the British having now travelled during 1500 km, but mid-January, Rommel left Tripoli to reach the Mareth line on 26.1.1943 and with the American forces pushing in the north of Tunesia, it was now obvious that the Afrika Korps could only delay British advances but no longer stop them, moreover the last great German counter-offensive at Medenine on 6.3.1943 was a complete defeat, Montgomery by that time had learnt a lot of Rommel's methods and duly informed by Ultra lured German forces into a trap destroying them with his numerous antitank guns and absolute air cover - on 9.3.1943 Rommel left Africa definitively but his spirit remained among the soldiers of the Afrika Korps - on 20.3. Montgomery outflanked the Mareth line with an audacious sweep through the hill country and forced the Germans to retreat to the line of Wadi Akarit, on 6.5.1943 was the final all-out drive to Tunis by the allied combined forces and the death of the Afrika Korps >> an excellent book as well as technical as litterary narrated by a specialist of military affairs giving also a very good background of the desert war including some interesting strategical guidelines
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